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TERRY FIRMA:
BACKGROUND DEMOCRACY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS
Frank I. Michelman*

I
Ages ago, I had the excellent luck to fall into a collaboration with
Terrance Sandalow to produce a casebook now long forgotten.1 There
could have been no more bracing or beneficial learning experience for
a fledgling legal scholar (meaning me). What brought us together in
deed was luck from my standpoint, but it was enterprise, too - the
brokerage of an alert West Publishing Company editor picking up on a
casual remark of mine as he made one of his regular sweeps through
Harvard Law School. A novice law professor, I mentioned to him how
much I admired a new essay in the field of local government law (a
subject I was just then trying to learn) by someone I didn't know but
who lived in that editor's home town of Minneapolis-Saint Paul. The
essay was Terrance Sandalow's since-become-classic piece on munici
pal home rule,2 and the West editor arranged to bring the two of us to
gether to discuss the casebook project that in fact materialized.
Sandalow's article gained wide and deserved recognition as a jewel
of municipal law scholarship. Few, if any, could have perceived it at

* Robert Walmsley University Professor, Harvard·University. - Ed. The author wishes
to thank Terrance Sandalow for watching over his shoulder as this Article was being written.
This Article is inspired by the following works: Terrance Sandalow, Abstract Democracy:
A Review of Ackerman's We The People, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 309 (1992); Terrance
Sandalow, A Skeptical Look at Contemporary Republicanism, 41 FLA. L. REV. 523 (1989);
Terrance Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L REV. 1033 (1981); Terrance
Sandalow, Equality and Freedom of Speech, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 831 (1995); Terrance
Sandalow, Federalism and SoCial Change, 43 LA w & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29 (1980); Terrance
Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162 (1977); Terrance
Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 653 (1975); Terrance
Sandalow, Social Justice and Fundamental Law: A Comment on Sager's Constitution, 88 Nw.
U. L. REV. 461 (1993); Terrance Sandalow, The Distrust of Politics, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 446
(1981); Terrance Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role for
the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV. 643 (1964); Terrance Sandalow, The Supreme Court in Politics,
88 MICH. L. REV. 1300, 1300-03 (1990) (reviewing ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE:
How THE BORK NOMINATION SHOOK AMERICA (1989)).

1. FRANK l. MICHELMAN & TERRANCE SANDALOW, GOVERNMENT IN URBAN AREAS
(1970).
2. Terrance Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the
Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV. 643 (1964) [hereinafter Sandalow, Limits of Municipal Power].
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the time - certainly I did not - as the opening of a distinctive and
demanding path of thought through what would be the gathering
thicket of our generation's constitutional-theoretic debates. More than
a decade would pass before Sandalow started posing questions in the
grand mode.3
II
What are constitutional norms? Seemingly, they arrive as messages
from something or someone we are supposed to accept as a social
authority - the Constitution, its authors, or its licensed oracles. En
cased in those messages are commands, instructions, or statements of
principles or rules of conduct. These act as norms for.me, or are nor
mative for me, insofar as my awareness of their content - of their
"being there" in the message from some social authority - gives me
reason counter to sheer, brute desire to select certain action choices
from some range of practically available alternatives, or to prefer
some options over others. (The reason might be prima facie, subject to
override.) Norms are in that sense obligatory. Some but not all norms
are legal norms, and some but not all legal norms are constitutional
legal norms (hereinafter, for convenience, "constitutional norms"). A
norm operates on me as a legal norm insofar as its constraining effect
is a particular instance of a general, presumptive obligation of fidelity
to law (the possible bases or justifications of which we need not here
explore). A legal norm is constitutional insofar as what it constrains is
the exercise of governmental powers, including the power to make
(other) law. The constraint can be institutional, reserving various
classes of powers to one or another branch or level of government. It
can be procedural, scripting the acts and forms for valid exercises of
powers. It can be substantive, dictating or restricting the topics re
specting which, the purposes for which, or the results with which pow
ers may and may not be exercised or, possibly, must be exercised.
Constitutional norms, then, are particular message-contents having
directive effects on government operations, and, moreover, effects
that really do depend on what recipients take these particular mes
sages to mean. How sure are we that such things really exist and really
happen? What we see directly, and all we see, are facts of general so
cial obedience to the pronouncements of "constitutional law" by vari
ous official bodies. Who knows, though, what factors decisively shape
these pronouncements? Might they not stem ultimately from causes
quite aside from attempts by anyone to find out the meanings of any
message-like things supposedly received from particular sources?
Maybe, in the end, there are no message-like things constraining gov3. See Terrance Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education, 42 U. CHI. L. REV.
653 (1975) (hereinafter Sandalow, Racial Preferences], discussed infra Part IV.
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ernment action. Maybe there are only the facts about what judges and
other actors actually do and get away with doing - facts rooted in
habit, culture, and interest, and quite recalcitrant to control by
message-meanings. Skeptical views of this sort appear in our debates.4
Professor Sandalow's name would not appear on your standard list
of known skeptics. We don't think of him as doubting that the
American practice of government commendably includes, as a main
feature, an expectation of compliance with messages issuing from
someone or something - "the Constitution" or its licensed oracles to someone else, containing directive meanings which it is the obliga
tion of recipients to find out and to follow. "There is not the same
freedom in construing the Constitution," Sandalow has written, "as in
constructing a moral code."5 (Note carefully the difference between
"construing" and "constructing."6) "Limits are implied by the very·na
ture of the task."7 Like anyone taking this view, Sandalow has to face
the problem of how a political society acquires authoritative ascer
tainments of the contents of constitutional messages.
As usually understood, the problem has two facets: one semantic,
the other institutional. The semantic aspect is this: Suppose you
wanted to settle a disagreement about the constitutional law applica
ble to a case. Suppose further that you had before you someone who
was guaranteed to know the' answer to whatever precise question you
put to' him, not itself directly framed as a question of law or legal
meaning. Exactly what question do you put to your wizard? Do you
ask him how a typical ratifier of the Constitution would have decided
the case, supposing he knew then all the social facts we know now? Do
you ask what result the words dictate - or what range of results they
allow - in the ordinary language either of the framers' generation or
of ours? Do you ask which resolution would make constitutional law
morally the best it can be, or which would maximize social wealth? Do

4. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEXAS L. REV. 1363 (1984).
5. Terrance Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1049 (1981)
[hereinafter Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation].
6. But see infra text accompanying notes 104-105.

7. Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1033; see also Terrance
Sandalow, Abstract Democracy: A Review of Ackerman's We The People, 9 CONST.
COMMENT. 309, 312 (1992) [hereinafter Sandalow; Abstract Democracy] (agreeing with
Bruce Ackerman that "the absence of a satisfactory theory [of constitutional change] . . . has
a corrosive effect on the commitment to constitutionalism"); Sandalow, Constitutional Inter
pretation, supra note 5, at 1049 (adding that "[t]he question whether legislation is within the
authority of the federal government must . . . be decided within a framework which recog
nizes . . . that government . . . as one of enumerated powers. We do not consider ourselves at
liberty to ignore the question or to answer it merely by demonstrating that the power can
best be exercised by the federal government"); Terrance Sandalow, Social Justice and Fun
damental Law: A Comment on Sager's Constitution, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 461, 463 (1993)
[hereinafter Sandalow, Social Justice] (referring sympathetically to the "common under
standing" that constitutional law is not coextensive with speculative morality).
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you ask which resolution most faithfully would track contemporary
society's prevailing beliefs about fundamental values? Or what?
The institutional aspect is this: Having decided on a key question,
to which branch of government or body of officials do we put it when
what we need is an "institutional settlement?"8 A .fixed answer to the
semantic question seems bound to affect how one responds to the in
stitutional question, but the converse also is true. For example,
Americans might, on the institutional side, feel committed to judicial
review, or stuck with it, as our conventionally settled means for put
ting constitutional law into effect. If so, that could help explain, on the
semantic side, the allure of the view that constitutional-legal meaning
is to be drawn from the intentions of the framers - "originalism," as
we now would call it. If constitutional interpretation does thus consist
in exegesis of written messages launched from outside the current po
litical and social scenes, it makes obvious good sense to have it done
by a politically neutral body of exegetical experts.9 That same institu
tional choice might seem strange, though, if, on the semantic side, we
sought to explain constitutional-legal discourse as a decidedly nonexe
getical activity by which "each generation gives formal expression to
the values it holds fundamental."10 It would be at least initially sur
prising to say, institutionally, that courts get the last word because of
their presumed relative detachment from democratic political pres�
sures, while at the same time saying, semantically; that constitutional
meaning most aptly is sourced in contemporary society's prevailing,
but constantly evolving, beliefs about "fundamental values."
The example is easily generalized. The semantic and institutional
questions always and inevitably reciprocate.11 Solving the simultane
ous equation has been a major preoccupation for the field of scholarly
debate we call constitutional theory.
Below, I will conduct a critical survey and parsing of Terrance
Sandalow's contributions to the debate. These contributions are disci
plined, contentious, stimulating, original, and undoubtedly distinctive
- although not, of course, completely distant from eontributions of

8. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1-9 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
9. See Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1034 (suggesting that
"the view that constitutional interpretation involves primarily an elucidation of the general
intentions of the framers is . . . attractive . ; . because it seems to support the institutional ar
rangements we have established for giving contemporary meaning to the Constitution").
10. Id. at 1068 (emphasis added).
11. See Sandalow, Social Justice, supra note 7, at 463 ("Because of the central role of the
judiciary in interpreting and enforcing the Constitution, theories of constitutional interpreta
tion have almost inevitably been influenced by theories about the appropriate distribution of
power between the courts and other, more politically accountable institutions of govern
ment.").
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others.12 If in hindsight they seem dated in some respects (the main
pieces all appeared before 1993), or if they do not form a completely
finished theory with all of its parts fully filled in and all of its uncer
tainties resolved, or if they do not answer every question we can put to
them, they nevertheless succeed powerfully in putting questions to
others - to the rest of us - to which satisfactory answers are awaited
still. They richly repay review.
III
Writing on local government law in 1964,13 Terrance Sandalow of
fered a striking proposal. Courts, he said, ought sometimes to act as
censors on city lawmaking but without applying any specific statutory
or constitutional restrictions on city powers. What centrally concerned
him, in a way soon to be explained, was not constitutional interpreta
tion but the avoidance of it. Nevertheless, and perhaps quite unex
pectedly even to Sandalow, the home rule essay marked the opening
of his special contribution to the debate over the judicial role in the
effectuation of constitutional norms.
In many states, constitutions or statutes confer a wide sweep of
prima facie legislative authority on at least major-size municipalities.14
The delegations usually can be read as stopping somewhere short of
allowing cities to legislate for their respective territories or constituen
cies in whatever ways would constitutionally be open to a state legisla
ture making laws for the whole state. For example, a state constitution
may authorize cities to legislate on any and all "local" or "municipal"
matters. The power usually is further qualified by subjecting local leg
islative powers to whatever limits state legislatures may impose by
statutes applicable to all municipalities. The basic considerations fa
voring such a general set-up are widely understood to be these: On the
one hand, cities should not have to obtain express enabling legislation
from the statehouse every time an arguable need appears for some ar
guably not-yet-authorized type of municipal lawmaking. On the other
hand, because city lawmaking can pose special risks to legitimate re
gional or statewide concerns not adequately represented in a given

12. Sandalow's ideas, while distinct from all of the following, also contain anticipations
of them all: current common-law approaches to constitutional adj udication, see, e.g., David
A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457 (2001);
Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Mode/for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1465
(1999), current democratic-experimentalist approaches, see, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles
F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998), and
current anti-judicial-supremacist approaches, see, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).

13. See Sandalow, Limits of Municipal Power, supra note 2.
14. The matters summarized in this paragraph are described and discussed in detail in
Sandalow, Limits of Municipal Power, supra note 2, at 645-71.

1832

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 99:1827

city's internal democratic processes, the state legislature should retain
its ability to impose generally stated bounds on city legislative powers.
Among the putative transmunicipal concerns motivating the reser
vation of state legislative control, the most obvious are concerns about
oppressive or inconsiderate extraterritorial applications or impacts of
city legislation.15 What will more directly engage us here is perception
of a different sort of risk - the risk that city legislation, even if its ex
traterritorial effects are negligible, may threaten values that are basic
in the view of the state as a whole. The term "values" here typically
refers to the same family of considerations that inspire constitutional
bills of rights, including individual liberty and equality and political
democracy. (In later writing, Sandalow would link them closely with
"conceptions of the proper role of government in our society."16) The
idea is that due regard for such values may require restraint of city
legislative powers even when a court would not, or ought not, con
clude that the city legislation in question is unconstitutional. For ex
ample, a city might adopt an ordinance or charter provision imposing
sharp restrictions on "independent" candidacies for city elective office.
Even supposing the restriction is not unconstitutional,17 the thought
runs, it is still desirable to leave the last word on its permissibility to
someone regarding the matter from the standpoint of the state's con
stituency as a whole.
Such was Sandalow's view, and it leads to the question of a possi
ble role for the courts in the requisite policing of city legislation. Typi
cally, state constitutions provide sufficient, if inexact, textual handles
for such a judicial role should courts see fit to use them. For example,
a court might for this purpose seize on the constitution's having re
stricted its initial grant of city lawmaking power to legislation dealing
with "municipal" matters. The court then could hold our illustrative
ballot-access measure ultra vires as "unmunicipal" (although not oth
erwise unconstitutional), precisely in virtue of its hard pressure against
a basic value of freedom of political association. The central question
posed by Sandalow was: ought courts assume or be assigned such a
role, and, if so, why, given the availability of the state legislature to
rein in municipal legislation by general lawmaking?18
Sandalow's response to the first question was affirmative, his rea
sons Madisonian. The relative "homogeneity" to be expected of many
city populations and governing bodies, in comparison with the state as
15. See id. at 692-707.
16. Terrance Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162, 1165
(1977) [hereinafter Sandalow, Judicial Protection]; see also infra text accompanying notes 68,
100.
17. Cf Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) (upholding the constitutionality of a state
statute of this kind).
18. See Sandalow, Limits of Municipal Power, supra note 2, at 708-09.
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a whole, and the relative paucity of contending interests or factions to
screen out lawmaking that offends seriously against substantial mi
nority interests, heighten the risk of "majority excesses" and "precipi
tate majority action,"19 The state legislature's reserved power to hem
in city lawmaking by general state legislation is a partial safeguard, but
it is imperfect because of the inertial difficulties of spurring a state
legislature to action.20 Courts, by contrast, are immediately available
to make precisely the contextually enriched evaluations that such
situations require, ·and they are not hobbled by the· organizational,
procedural, and pluralistic political restraints that (quite properly)
hobble legislatures. A judicial ruling of "unmunicipal," moreover, has
only the "suspensive veto" effect of "shifting the level of decision from
municipal to state government" (because the legislature can always
pass a general enabling act to authorize city actions of the type in
question) - an effect that clearly tends to "maximize community val
ues" once one grants the relative trustworthiness of state, as compared
with municipal, legislative processes to give such values their dues.21
Butcannot courts play the desired role, to exactly the constitution
ally apt extent, simply by enforcing the provisions of state and federal
bills of rights against municipal legislation exactly as they would
against state legislation of parallel content? Why, then, launch the
courts on some additional, transexegetical search for "basic commu
nity values" to enforce against the legislative products of local. democ
racy, with the obvious extra risk of undue suppression of local democ
racy that such a launching involves?
Sandalow's answer began with the observation - still dependent
on the Madisonian premise of the state legislature's superior trustwor
thiness to give basic values their dues - that it is unwise to leave
courts with no possible recourse against possibly precipitate municipal
actions, such as our ballot-access measure, except holding them un
constitutional. A court may be inclined toward a holding of unconsti
tutionality where it has nothing but the decision of one possibly way
ward locality to testify to the existence of a sufficient. public
justification for the resulting restriction of political liberties. But a
holding of unconstitutionality, once made, will bind as precedent if
and when "the time comes that the larger community, as represented
in the state legislature, determines that the general welfare requires"
the restriction and that constitutional values at least can tolerate it.22
In that way, due doubts about the reliability of local legislative proc-

19. Id. at 710; cf. Sandalow, Judicial Protection, supra note 16, at 1191-93 (discussing
pluralist safeguards in the operations of Congress).
20. See Sandalow, Limits of Municipal Power, supra note 2, at 714.
21. Id. at 711, 715.
22. Id. at 712.
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esses may tum themselves into an undue judicial suppression of a
statewide democratic will.
It remains still to describe some method to be used by courts, once
loosed from the discipline of ordinary constitutional interpretation, to
ascertain the content of basic community values and to measure the
degree of disregard for them contained in any given instance of city
lawmaking - bearing in mind that the method must be one that does
not lead courts to trespass unacceptably on the proper domain of the
legislature. Sandalow's home rule essay does no more, and purports to
do no more, than make a start on showing how it may be possible to
delineate such a method.
Acting in their role as guards against precipitate local action,
courts are to invoke values that are "deeply rooted" not just at large in
the community but "in the legal system."23 Thus, for example, the
"novelty" of a piece of city legislation may weigh against it. But per
haps most obviously and simply, it follows from Sandalow's argument
that a city law that would be found to "raise[] a substantial constitu
tional question" if enacted by the state legislature should not survive
judicial review for unmunicipalness.24 To that extent, constitutional
bills of rights can provide a "starting point" and an "analogy" for this
ilk of judicial judgments. Nevertheless, if Sandalow's argument had
stopped right there it would still have left us able to distinguish be
tween a freer-ranging (but somehow still judicial) process of basic
value detection, special to the context of city legislation, and a more
familiar and insinuatedly more conventionally disciplined process of
constitutional interpretation. The argument, then, would have carried
no interesting implications for standard-form constitutional interpreta
tion.
The argument, however, did not stop there. It went further, be
cause Sandalow wished to head off an easily anticipated objection:
that it cannot be any business of an independent judidary to contra
dict the people's elected representatives - even their local elected
representatives - on the matter of the contemporary community's ba
sic values. That objection is precluded, Sandalow said, to anyone who
accepts in general the judicial "power to invalidate legislation on con
stitutional grounds." Permitting judges to do that, he said, involves no
different or greater encroachment on representative democracy than
would be wrought by "authorizing uudicial] invalidation of novel mu
nicipal powers inconsistent with basic values."25 This is true, wrote
Sandalow - adding tµat most lawyers know that it is true - even
granting that constitutional interpretation is "to some extent circum-

23. Id. at 716, 717.
24. Id. at 720.
25. Id. at 721.
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scribed by the language of the constitution and the course of constitu
tional history."26 Sandalow thus pointedly denied that "constitutional
interpretation" names a more tightly or objectively disciplined method
of judicial decisionmaking - or even a substantially different method
- than that involved in comparing a city law with the contemporary
statewide community's basic values.
The home rule essay ends wit. h this denial, leaving it unexplained
- except, perhaps, for one remark a few pages earlier, in a different
context, to the effect that "the fundamental values of the community
are not static; they are in a process of evolution."27 That community
values change continuously over time - or, if you like, "evolve" - is
a hard proposition to deny. Nothing follows, however, about whether
constitutional meanings change apace unless you already have estab
lished an equation or linkage between constitutional meanings and
contemporary community values. Needless to say, the claim of such an
equation is highly controversial in American constitutional culture. No
argument for it appeared in the home rule essay.
IV
Nor did a full one appear in 1975 when Sandalow - in an article
supporting the constitutional permissibility of racial preferences in
higher education28 - first turned his attention directly to what he
called "the great question of constitutional law," that of "the means by
which the [Supreme] Court can accommodate" the "democratic val
ues" ensconced in our constitutional tradition with "the need to rec
ognize evolution in the [other] values to be accorded constitutional
protection."29 Certain premises were apparent in this way of framing
the question: that a main point of the practice of constitutional law is
to keep government operations in line with certain values; that the
values thus to be redeemed are both traditional and evolving, but most
fundamentally are the values "of our [contemporary] society," which
means they are not drawn from some source above, before, or outside
it;30 that they include both substantive values, of the sort that particu
lar political decisions always must implicitly order in some way, and
the democratic procedural values calling for. "politically responsible

26. Id.
27. Id. at 718 (offering this, along with the idea of local governments as sites of relatively
safe "experimentation in the accommodation of competing values, " as a reason for cautious
use of any roving judicial commission to invalidate municipal legislation).
28. Sandalow, Racial Preferences, supra note 3.
29. Id. at 662-63.
30. Id. at 700. The point would become more emphatic in subsequent writings. See infra
Parts VI-VIII.
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institutions"31 to resolve disagreements over orderings of substantive
values. A final, if somewhat disconsonant, apparent premise was that
the decidedly unrepresentative Supreme Court plays some sort of
leading role in the pursuit of the required accommodations among
values.32
The racial preferences article argues at length33 that in equal pro
tection litigation - assuming we are not simply to drop the subject of
the compatibility of legislation with the equal protection guarantee, "a
move toward which neither the Court nor its critics" (nor Sandalow)
"seems disposed"34 - there is no escape from the judiciary's "substi
tut[ing] its judgment for the legislature's on the relative merits of
competing social goals."35 To speak more exactly, though, what
Sandalow showed beyond a doubt is this: to find that a law discrimi
nates impermissibly against some person or class of persons, or treats
"unequally" some person or class, is necessarily to reject the law
maker's implicit selections and rankings of social goals in favor of
some different selection and/or ranking. It does not precisely follow,
and Sandalow did not show, that the adjudicating court must substi
tute its own goal-ranking choices for the legislature's. A court impos"
ing goal- or value-rankings upon a legislature still might purport, in
perfectly good faith, to draw such rankings objectively, from sources
beyond and prior both to its own action and to the legislature's and by
methods other than ungoverned choice. Such sources might include
constitutional history, text, and tradition; such methods might also in
clude exegesis or, oppositely, transcendent moral or economic reason.
Nevertheless, in the face of such obvious alternatives and with lit
tle supporting argument, Sandalow in 1975 proclaimed the view that
"[c]onstitutional law evolves to reflect the changing circumstances and
values of our society."36 "Few would wish it otherwise,"37 he added, as
if the proposition explained itself. Pragmatic reasons for it leap to
mind, which Sandalow would mention in future writings.38 Still, this
31. Sandalow, Racial Preferences, supra note 3, at 662.
32. See id. at 700 (apparently acceding to judicial review as "the institutional mechanism
that has developed for giving meaning to the Constitution").
33. See id. at 654-81.
34. Id. at 661.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 700.
37. Id.
38. See Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1046 ("The amendment
process . . . simply will not sustain the entire burden of adaptation that must be borne if the
Constitution is to remain a vital instrument of government."); Terrance Sandalow, Equality
and Freedom of Speech, 21 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 831, 833 (1995) [hereinafter Sandalow, Free
dom of Speech] (warning that a result of tying constitutional adjudication to "principles for
mulated in response to issues very different from those we now confront" will be that the
contemporary issues "will not be intelligently resolved").
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central proposition - for that is what it turns out to be - of
Sandalow's constitutional thought stands obviously in need of a more
substantial defense, if only because of its keenly paradoxical feel when
combined with seemingly irreversible acceptance of a key role for the
Supreme Court in the effectuation of constitutional law.39 Sandalow's
choice on this occasion, however, was not to defend the proposition at
length.
Of course there can be no doubt, and Sandalow showed, that
community values and value-orderings inevitably change over time,
along with changes in perceptions of social reality.40 But the proposi
tion that constitutional-legal meaning is yoked to social-value change
is different, and much more controversial. Sandalow left unmentioned
- possibly because it was nowhere near so well developed then in the
debates as it has since become41 - the contrary view that the Constitu
tion's meaning as law remains, and for the sake of democracy must re
main, as it was made by those with self-governing authority to make it
(the people) until they see fit to make it over (by amending the
Constitution).
How, after all, might we confer upon constitutional law a demo
cratic credential, a democratic pedigree, if doing so seemed important
to us? (It has not always seemed, and does not now seem, overridingly
important to everyone.42) Most straightforwardly, we would do it by
explaining, if we could, how the people of a country, its demos, from
time to time actually do legislate the constitution. That is the "demo
cratic positivist" idea, as we may call it, to which Sandalow in 1975
paid no mind. He would do so later,43 and it was then that his own an
swer to the question of the democratic pedigree and legitimacy of con
stitutional law, understood as a direct expression of contemporary
community .values, would come into sharper focus. For now, though,
Sandalow confined himself to the question of how courts possibly
could play a leading but still judicial role in the effectuation of consti
tutional law, taking for granted the tight linkage of constitutional-legal
meaning to evolving community values.
Mar b ury-like,44 Sandalow carved out such a role for the courts in
the course of rejecting the judiciary's claim to a final decisive voice in
39. See Sandalow, Racial Preferences, supra note 3, at 659 ("Unless a particular choice of
values is prescribed by constitutional tradition, a judicial determination seems incompatible
with the nation's commitment to democratic decisionmaking.").
40. See id. at 662, 680-81 .
41. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, W E THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 6-7 (1991).
42. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Getting Normative: The Role of Natural Rights in
Constitutional Adjudication, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 93, 111-12 (1995).
43. See infra Part VII.
44. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (disclaiming jurisdiction by
upholding the judicial duty to disregard a statute found to be in conflict with the Constitu
tion).

1838

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 99:1827

pending social and political controversies over the use of racial prefer
ences in higher-education admissions. The key was a theory of politi
cal responsibility that had first appeared in the home rule essay of
1964. In the absence of a clear societal consensus against the "value
choices" implied by adoption of racial preferences, Sandalow thought,
a deliberate choice in their favor by a state legislature must be consti
tutionally decisive.45 In such a case, priority must go to the body that is
the more "politically responsible" - meaning, first, the more recep
tive and sensitive to information regarding "the impact of a policy
upon the various segments of the society;" second, the more likely to
keep its value-ordering judgments attuned to "the values of the citi
zenry;" and, third, the more amenable to "compromise and accommo
dation that facilitates development of policies that maximize the satis
faction of constituents' desires."46
State legislatures presumably measure up well to these standards.
(Otherwise, what sense could we possibly make of the professed
democratic "commitment" of American constitutionalism?47) But just
as city councils presumptively do not fully measure up,48 unelected
state boards of regents and university faculties may fall even shorter,
considering how parochial and how limited, by comparison with the
population at large, we may expect to be the ranges of the interests,
loyalties, experiences, and sensibilities of their members.49 "[T)he rea
sons supporting judicial deference to legislative judgment [do not)
support equal deference to the judgment of a . . . law school faculty."50
Moreover, trying to pretend that they do is bound over time to pro
duce results that "unnecessarily encroach upon constitutional val
ues."51 We learned the argument in 1964:52 either courts treat the de
terminations of law school faculties with a deference they do not
deserve, or courts allow themselves to be led by the faculty's obvious
lack of democratic credentials to produce a holding of unconstitution
ality that will be excessive if and when a state legislature comes con
siderately to conclude in favor of preferences.

45. See Sandalow, Racial Preferences, supra note 3, at 696, 698 ("Balancing the dangers
of . . . preferences against their potential gains is a delicate, and ultimately legislative, task.
There is no warrant for the courts to [with]draw the issue from the political forum. ").
46. Id. at 695.
47. See id. at 699 ("A commitment to democratic values requires considerable judicial
deference to deliberate [state] legislative judgments . . . . ).
"

48. See supra text accompanying notes 19-21.
49. See Sandalow, Racial Preferences, supra note 3, at 696.
50. Id. at 699.
51. Id.
52. See supra text accompanying note 22.
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Sandalow nevertheless maintained that courts should refrain from
overturning faculty-initiated preferential admissions policies. His ar
guments to that effect53 need not concern us here. What does concern
us is Sandalow's call upon courts engaged in constitutional review to
"develop doctrines that consign ultimate authority" for policy choices
under evolving basic community values "to the legislature, where in a
democracy it rightly belongs. "54
v

If "democracy" generally prefers legislative to judicial policy
choice, why does it? What exactly is the democratic ideal? Sandalow
told us in 1975, not once but twice. It is, he said, the "ideal that gov
ernment policies ought to respond to the wishes of the citizenry."55
And it is, he said, the "ideal that politically responsible institutions
should determine the direction of government policy."56 Thus the
same essay delivered two nonidentical statements of "the democratic
ideal" - one cast in terms of process (that "politically responsible in
stitutions should determine the direction of government policy"), the
other in terms of outcome (that "government policies ought to re
spond to the wishes of the citizenry"). In the context of that essay,
there was of course no contradiction. Whichever way you put it,
Sandalow plainly meant, the democratic ideal is fulfilled, within
American society's practical capacity to fulfill it, when a lawmaking
forum and process are sufficiently "politically responsible."
In hindsight, we can see three major pieces still missing from the
developing Sandalovian theory of judicial review as it stood in 1975.
First, the theory as of then lacked a fully elaborated account of how
courts - acting judicially as opposed to legislatively - can develop
their own profiles of contemporary society's basic values, against
which to test (deferentially) the lawmaking acts of a normally acting
state or national legislature or to test (more aggressively) those of a
local or unelected official body. Sandalow never has explained at
length by what sufficiently disciplined methods judges possibly might
reach and support the findings he would require of them in constitu
tional cases: that "the. principles upon which they propose to confer
constitutional status express values that our society does [now] hold to

53. See Sandalow, Racial Preferences, supra note 3, at 701-03.
54. Id. at 703; see also Terrance Sandalow, The Distrust of Politics, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV.
446, 447-50 (1981) [hereinafter Sandalow, Distrust of Politics] (compiling examples of issues
"remov[ed] from politics [by decisions of the Supreme Court] that, in a democracy, one
would expect to be resolved by a political process").
55. Sandalow, Racial Preferences, supra note 3, at 695.
56. Id. at 700.
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be fundamental."57 But the general outlines of his response seem clear,
from this and subsequent work. Never doubting that the present is· de
scended from the past, Sandalow has felt able to suggest approaches to
the task using history, text, and precedent in ways not unfamiliar to
constitutional lawyers - indeed not clearly distinguishable from typi
cal constitutional-legal argument, except by the implied commitment
to deference, in the end, to the acts of top-of-the-line representative
govemment.58
Second, the theory as of 1975 lacked a full defense of contempo
rary-values constitutionalism against its looming democratic-positivist
adversary.59 Why should evolving but unenacted basic community val
ues provide the touchstone of constitutional meaning? Third, the
theory, in hindsight, needs further work on the matter of "the demo
cratic ideal." We have noticed Sandalow's equivocation between a
process-bound equation of the American democratic ideal with final
decision of public questions by well-oiled institutions of representative
government and an outcome-bound equation of this ideal with sub
stantial correspondence between legislative choices and "the wishes of
the citizenry." Confinement of the ideal of democracy to a choice (or
merger) between these two would soon, however, prove controversial.
In the years to come, some would contend that democracy must en
compass a good deal more than either - in order, in a liberal mind
set, to figure as a value at all.60
VI
In 1977, Sandalow undertook again to outline a mode of judicial
constitutional review that would provide worthwhile support for con
stitutional values and still, "by respecting the ultimate authority of the
political process to determine the values to be expressed by law," con
form to "the proper limits of judicial authority in a democracy."61
Again he made the challenge as hard as it can be, by equating consti
tutional values with basic, contemporary community value-orderings.
Such an equation was required, as Sandalow repeatedly would con
tend,62 by the plain facts of American constitutional-legal history and
practice. Over the course of that history, applied constitutional law has
57. See, e.g., Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1069.
58. See id. at 1055-60; Sandalow, Freedom of Speech, supra note 38, at 831-34; Sandalow,
Social Justice, supra note 7, at 464-66; infra text accompanying notes 69-74, 79-80.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41.
60. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW ch. 1 (1996); FRANK I.
MICHELMAN, BRENNAN AND DEMOCRACY 11-25, 33-34, 40-51 (1999); Frank I. Michelman,
Human Rights and the Limits of Constitutional Theory, 13 RATIO JURIS 63 (2000).
61. See Sandalow, Judicial Protection, supra note 16, at 1183.
62. See Sandalow, Abstract Democracy, supra note 7, at 311-12.
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undergone many glaring alterations that cannot be explained by refer
ence to any formally adopted constitutional amendment.63 Of course,
one can always try to explain these alterations as the results of judi
cially tooled-up interpretations and applications of underlying legal
principles and rules whose meanings have remained unchanged since
first they were textually laid down. But Sandalow shows that one can't
do so convincingly without either wrenching historical enactments out
of context64 or else casting the supposedly constant, original meanings
at a level of abstraction so high and decontextualized that the work of
"applying" them to the major political issues of later times is not truly
adjudicative, appropriate to a non-popular branch of government, but
rather involves the sorts of choices that it seems committed democrats
would reserve to the people or representative government.65
Sandalow's reasoning from these plainly true facts is simple.
Granting (1) that the nation has a "democratic commitment[)" to "the
proposition that the Constitution's legitimacy depends on popular
consent;"66 and therefore (2) that constitutional meanings "must have
a purchase on values reasonably attributable to the society;"67 then (3)
if constitutional meanings have changed, they must have changed in
tune with changes in basic community values. In sum: "constitutional
law must . . . be understood as the means by which effect is given to
those ideas that from time to time are held to be fundamental in de
fining the limits and distribution of governmental power in our soci
ety. "68
The parallel view of constitutional meanings is that they change
along with changes in community value-orderings. On that view, it has
seemed to Sandalow that an independent judiciary cannot plausibly
compete with a decently well-functioning representative political as
sembly as the institution best situated to identify constitutional values
and assign them their due weight in lawmaking. How, he has inquired,
can courts, "in the end, set their judgment concerning the content of
[contemporary societal beliefs and attitudes] against a deliberate and
broadly based political decision[?]"69 Harking back to the conception
of political responsibility he had spelled out two years earlier,70
Sandalow in 1977 again found that the outcomes of "broadly represen63. See id. at 310-12; Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1038-45.
64. See Sandalow, Abstract Democracy, supra note 7, at 1046-49, 1064-68; Sandalow, Judicial Protection, supra note 16, at 1180-81.
65. See Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1036-37, 1045-46.
66. See Sandalow, Abstract Democracy, supra note 7, at 330.
67. Id.
68. Sandalow, Judicial Protection, supra note 16, at 1184.
69. Id. at 1 186 (emphasis added).
70. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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tative" political processes are "as close as we are likely to get to the
statement of a norm that can be said to reflect the values of the soci
ety."71 Also again, though, he found the premise of a "deliberate and
broadly based political decision" to be variably applicable to various
kinds and levels of lawmaking bodies. He suggested a hierarchy of re
liability, running from decisions of "Congress after full debate or em
bodied in legislation recently enacted by most states" down through
possibly maverick school boards and city councils.72 Without locating a
particular lawmaking process in the hierarchy, Sandalow thought, one
could not say whether courts act counterdemocratically or rather pro
democratically by preferring their own readings of contemporary
value-orderings to those implicit in the products of that particular pro
cess. For courts thus to act is antidemocratic where the particular leg
islative processes rank high. But when legislation comes out of lower
ranking processes - and that might include even Congress when its
attentions have not been properly engaged73 - then a court may ad
vance rather than hinder democracy by forwarding its own readings of
contemporary value orderings.74
Sandalow's slight equivocation over "the democratic ideal"75 now
stands resolved. We see that democracy, for Sandalow, consists finally
in a kind of outcome and not in a kind of institutional set-up or proce
dure. Democracy ultimately means a due correspondence between the
value orderings wrought by representative government's legislative
acts and the value-orderings currently attributable to society or the
people. Well-functioning representative institutions are, then, a means
or medium of democracy, not the thing itself. If democracy is af
fronted by excessive subjection of representative government to judi
cial tutelage or restraint, that is not by reason of any intrinsic value as
cribed to people deciding these things for themselves either directly or
through representatives. The objection to judicial supremacy is not
any right people have to active self-government, or any interest they
have in political autonomy as such. The objection, rather, is that judi
cial supremacy ·�weakens law's responsiveness to those who are gov
erned by it."76 A democratic society indeed is defined as one that
71. Sandalow, Judicial Protection, supra note 16, at 1187.
72. Id. at 1186-87. Sandalow's rejection as "undemocratic " of the Court's decision in
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1972), rests in part on his factual view that anti-abortion laws
were not at the time contrary to any emergent state legislative consensus nor were they the
product of state legislative heedlessness or inattention. See Terrance Sandalow, Federalism
and Social Change, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29, 35-36 (1980) [hereinafter Sandalow,

Federalism].

73. See Sandalow, Judicial Protection, supra note 16, at 1188.
74. See id. at 1187; Sandalow, Racial Preferences, supra note 3, at 700-01.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 55-56.
76. See Sandalow, Distrust of Politics, supra note 54, at 459 (emphasis added).
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makes heavy use of politically responsible institutions of representa
tive government, but that is only because such institutions happen to
recommend themselves as a chief means by which governmental pol
icy is channeled into correspondence with "the interests and desires"
- and one may as well add the values - "of those whose lives it gov
erns."77
Not that representative government is the only available means to
that end, or in every contingency the most advantageous means.
Believing that courts do have certain advantages of detachment and
habituation to reasoned reflection,78 Sandalow would want them avail
able to challenge - suspensively, not irrevocably - not only the leg
islative products of local or otherwise politically not-so-responsible
lawmaking bodies, but even congressional and statewide legislative ac
tions to the extent that those appear to have been deviant, rash, or de
liberatively lax. The trick is for courts to find ways of framing their
judgments in such cases in a way that avoids finality,79 leaving them
room to defer later to duly considerate, politically responsible proc
esses coming out the other way. Judicial review thus would become a
useful "step" in the "political process" of community-values expres
sion, rather than a "means of imposing limits upon" that process.80 All,
then, would be well for democracy understood as correspondence
between laws and contemporary community values - would be, in
deed, about as good as it ever can get.
In sum, Sandalow's 1977 contribution fleshes out the claim he
started in 1964, and extended in 1975, for a process-based differentia
tion of the strictness of judicial scrutiny of the lawmaking products of
various sorts of institutions that make law in our country.
VII
We turn now to Sandalow's rebuttal of the democratic positivist
claim: that only from periodic acts of decided legislation by a country's
people may a court hope to draw democratically tolerable grounds for
rejecting the legislative acts of representative bodies. The rejection
came when the time was ripe, in the form of a review of the work of
our foremost democratic-positivist theorist, Bruce Ackerman.81 The
first ground of the rejection was the seeming rank empirical failure of
77. Id. at 468. Sandalow speaks in this sentence of "politics," not "representative gov
ernment." But context makes clear that "politics" refers to conduct of the "political process"
of representative government.
78. See Sandalow, Judicial Protection, supra note 16, at 1178.
79. See id. at 1 1 86.
80. Sandalow, Distrust of Politics, supra note 54, at 447 n.4; see also Sandalow, Judicial
Protection, supra note 16, at 1186, 1 189.
81. See Sandalow, Abstract Democracy, supra note 7.
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democratic-positivist theory to match the facts of American constitu
tional history and practice - the point being, again, that American
constitutional-legal content has undergone, over the years, alteration
too drastic to be explained convincingly as a product either of formal
amendment or of any honestly "judicial" process of interpretation of
enacted constitutional texts.82 Evidently, constitutional meaning. has
changed apace with tinenacted; undeliberated, indigenously, and or
ganically developed changes in basic community values reflecting
seismic changes in basic community conditions - changes occurring
mainly in the social background, not the political foreground.83 To give
you the flavor:
A mobilized citizenry did not arise to demand greater sexual freedom,
but changing sexual mores . . . nonetheless led to substantial restrictions

on governmental power to interfere with sexual conduct. A mobilized
citizenry did arise to demand that government cease discrimination on
the basis of sex, but it failed to persuade the People . . . Yet, changing
societal attitudes toward the social role of women yielded constitutional
limits on sex discrimination that are, at most, only marginally different
from those that would have existed if the equal rights amendment had
been adopted.84
·

In other words, if you seek a democratic source for legitimate con
stitutional law, you may find it in the social background, even if not in
the political foreground. So far as concerns the manufacture of consti
tutional-legal content, it is in the background, not the foreground, that
the demos ultimately works its will: organically, nonfocally, nondelib
erately, nonlegislatively, through the seismic movements that count
less people's actions produce over time in the social situations, needs,
possibilities, and sensibilities that give rise to community values.
This seems a direct rejection of Ackerman's view. In a democratic
country, Ackerman believes (as accurately reported by Sandalow),
constitutional adjudication must mean application of " decisions made
by the People on those occasions when they have spoken, whether or
not they have embodied their will in amendments adopted pursuant to
the procedures prescrib�d by Article V."85 But then how discern that
the People have spoken? The People, after all, are never corporately
or instantaneously observable.86 They are counterfactual, an idea of
populist-democratic reason. Nevertheless, Ackerman maintains, the
idea of them is capable of being approximately represented by time-

82. See supra text accompanying notes 63-65.
83. See Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1046-49.
84. Sandalow, Abstract Democracy, supra note 7, at 324-25; see also Sandalow, Federal
ism, supra note 72, at 29-30.
85. Sandalow, Abstract Democracy, supra note 7, at 315 (emphasis added).
86. See generally EDMUND s. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE (1988).
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extended courses of political events.87 Sometimes, Ackerman says, a
course of events can disclose the existence of a "mobilized majority"
in favor of some notable shift in the country's officially recognized po
litical orientation and practice - a majority of the populace, but
counted by giving special weight to the fraction of them that in its ad
dress to the pending question is focused, persistent, informed, deliber
ate, public-spirited, and, finally, deeply persuaded. An Ackermanian
"mobilized" majority is a clear and strong, sustained and committed
numerical majority - one that arises, consolidates, and persists over a
time during which the matters in question are publicly controverted at
a high level of energy, earnestness, and concern.
Ackerman's democratic ideal is one of decided, if nonformal,
higher law-speaking by the People, made effective on ordinary law
making by courts exercising powers of judicial review. There is har
mony, up to a point, between this ideal and an ideal conception of de
mocracy as correspondence-in-fact of legislative value-orderings to
contemporary community values. The harmony fails to the degree that
contemporary community value-orderings may have left behind the
ones expressed by the most recent episodes of higher-law speaking by
the People, which may have occurred some years ago.88 Still, so far as I
can see, Sandalow offers no express conceptual or moral objection to
Ackerman's democracy-based demand for the subordination of gov
ernment operations to the People's most recent, nonformal, higher
lawmaking acts. He merely finds it empirically vapid to the point of
uselessness for judges conscientiously aiming to keep within the
bounds of the adjudicative function. Where Ackerman sees clearly
marked elevations of focus and public-spiritedness in the People's po
litical participation during his designated "constitutional moments,"
Sandalow sees no way for a court to determine whether popular politi
cal actions over any given passage of time evince any exceptional de
gree of deliberation or public spirit.89 Where Ackerman claims a suffi
ciently clear and specific higher legislative content in the People's
agitations over Reconstruction and the New Deal, Sandalow sees
endlessly debatable complexity and ambiguity90 - or else, if clarity,
then again clarity only at a uselessly high level of abstraction.91 "The
People," writes Sandalow, have "decided too little to nourish judicial

87. In regard to this statement and the balance of the paragraph, see Frank I.
Michelman, Thirteen Easy Pieces, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1297, 1312-13, 1314 {1995), and sources
cited.
88. See Frank I. Michelman, Constitutional Authorship by the People, 74 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1605, 1624-25 (1999).
89. See Sandalow, Abstract Democracy, supra note 7, at 326-30.
90. See id. at 318-25, 330-36.
91. See id. at 325.
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judgment on the issues that arise during the long periods of 'normal
politics.'"92
VIII
According to Sandalow's argument, dem()cratic-positivist justifica
tions of judicial review simply can't withstand the hard facts of tempo
ral change in judge-declared constitutional-legal doctrine. The same
facts also, in Sandalow's view, defeat the sort of "rights
foundationalist" justification that has come to figure as a kind of oppo
site to democratic positivism.93
Start with commitment to a "democratic ideal" having these as its
three "central premises:" that "law should be responsive to the inter
ests and values of the citizenry;"94 that it should have "the consent of
the governed;"95 and that "in the long run" it will be thus responsive,
and have this consent, "only if lawmakers are amenable to popular
control through ordinary political processes,'�96 affording the governed
"active and continuous participation . . . either directly or by represen
tation."97 The democratic commitment, thus defined, appears to be
compromised by any subjection of the legislative determinations of
representative government to final and insuperable displacement by
courts in the name of any values defined externally and antecedently
to those very determinations, including so-called fundamental rights.
The incursion on democratic rule nevertheless might be "tolerable,"
Sandalow allows, for the sake of securing due respect for certain val
ues aside from democracy - liberty would be an example - assuming
said incursion is clearly confined, leaving unscathed the main core of
representative-governmental authority.98
But the judicial incursion on democracy will be neither warranted
nor confined unless courts have a special ability to see and to say,
more or less exactly, what the other values are and what limits they
impose on democratic choice. Courts might be comparatively well po
sitioned for. such work, if the other values were once and forever fixed:
Sandalow recalls sympathetically the view that the courts' "relative
isolation from men and events and their commitment to the processes
of reason" give them a certain kind of comparative institutional ad-

92. Id. at 331-32.
93. See ACKERMAN, supra note 41, at 10-16.
94. Sandalow, Judicial Protection, supra note 16, at 1166.
95. Id. at 1168.
96. Id. at 1166.
97. Id. at 1178.
98. Id.
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vantage.99 The advantage vanishes, however, when we see the other
values in their true light, as changing over time along with evolving
"conceptions of the proper role of government in our society."100 As
Sandalow puts the matter:
The question that Marshall answered [in Marbury

v.

Madison] was

whether courts or legislatures should have final authority to resolve con
troversies about the meaning of a document whose content was (under
stood to be) fixed at the time of its adoption. The question today is
whether courts or legislatures should have final authority to resolve con
troversies about the meaning of a document whose content evolves over
time.101

And since the facts unmistakably show that the . "contents" (meaning
the meanings) of our "document" do evolve over time, we can't de
fend judicial review as a marginal compromise of the democratic ideal
for the sake of fundamental rights for all time fixed.
True, we could think in terms of fundamental rights without
thinking of their content as being for all time fixed. Community value�
evolving over time could sponsor similarly evolving ideas about fun
damental rights. But once we admit that constitutional law thus aims
to reflect values understood as at all times evolving in the bosom of
the community, then constitutional meaning, being not tied to any
"independently existing principles of societal morality," would not be
fit for final resolution by politically nonresponsible judges overriding
politically responsible legislatures.102 No advantage then could be
claimed for the detachment and impartiality of an independent judici
ary, viewed as an umpire of democratic political struggle bounded by
rules of the game in the form of non-transgressible individual rights.103
If the rules of the game are changing rather than fixed, then surely, on
democratic principles, determination of their content belongs in the
hands of the players, a.k.a. the People.
Is all this so obviously so? Granted - by Ackerman and by me constitutional content cannot plausibly be understood to be fixed as of
the times of formal adoption either of the original Constitution or its
textual amendments. Granted - by me, for the sake of argument content can only plausibly be understood as changing continuously,
through time along with changes in the social background. Sandalow
seemingly wants to deduce from that premise the conclusion that con
stitutional contents do not and cannot pre-exist a court's or legisla-

99. Id. at 1178.
100. Id. at 1165.
101. Id. at 1165-66.
102. Id. at 1172 (emphasis added); see also id. at 1179-80 (extending the critique to the
"suspect classification" branch of equal-protection review).
103. See id.
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ture's decisions regarding them; that they rather must be con
meaning created,105 on the very occasions of deciding - in
and by the very acts of deciding - what they are. If so, then indeed we
must grant the clear institutional advantage to the politically responsi
ble legislature over the independent judiciary.106 But why conclude
that it is so? The premise of constantly evolving value-orderings does
not support the conclusion of all-and-only "constructed" value
orderings, if by that we mean orderings that come into being only in
and through the process of a court's or legislature's deciding or de
claring what they are.
True, there is a sense in which anyone's report or rendition of con
temporary society's up-to-the-minute basic value-orderings must
involve the reporter in making "choices" that the community itself has
not "made" and never will make.107 The reporter, no doubt, will be re
quired to choose, in the sense of identify, the best alternative "con
struction" from a number of competing reasonable "constructions,"
meaning interpretations, of the societal value-orderings implied by
some historical series of political and other social happenings.108 But
someone exercising that kind of interpretative selection or "choice" granted that the choice is not deducible from the language or history
of any particular documents, or from any other form of certified evi
dence109 - need not and indeed cannot be regarding the object of in
terpretative choice as one that is brought into existence ("produced")
only by the choice she will make.110 To the contrary, to interpret or
"construe" an object is to position that object as one about whose best
description or accounting people can disagree intelligently, and thus as
one whose best description or accounting is independent of what any
one will say about it.111 On Sandalow's own word, there are always
"elements of reason . . . intrinsic to [a] process" of selecting the best
interpretive account of contemporary community values.112 The door
thus remains logically quite open to a contention that an independent
judiciary has a better chance of saying worthy things about constitustructed,104

104. Id. at 1170, 1185.
105. See id. at 1171-72. But see supra text accompanying note 6.
106. See Sandalow, Judicial Protection, supra note 16, at 1 1 82 ("If the court is to judge
from within an evolving tradition . . . it lacks the fixed point of reference that is necessary for
deciding whether [community] values were given their due.").
107. Id. at 1171.
108. See id. at 1168-70.

'

109. See Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1054.
1 10. See Sandalow, Judicial Protection, supra note 16, at 1 173 (asking why, "[i]f constitu
tional rules are a product of judicial choice," they should "be permitted to control" the acts
of representative government).
1 11. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
112. Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1055.
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tional meanings, equated with contemporary community values; than
a politically implicated, incumbent legislature has.
IX
. What logic admits, however, common sense and experience may
reject. We cannot fault Sandalow for doubting that the latter give us
much reason to think that small, inevitably somewhat elite or other
wise narrow judicial bodies are going to do better with assessments of
contemporary community values than we may expect from the opera
tions of state and federal legislatures working decently well. To give
courts a plausible comparative advantage, we must put a substantial
conceptual distance between the supposedly governing values and
contemporary social life - as we would do if we sourced the govern
ing values either in a fixed and transcendent table of rights or in
somewhat remotely past political enactments. Sandalow, however, has
denied the descriptive accuracy and the normative adequacy of both
those sorts of accounts of American constitutionalism.
His grounds for rejecting them have been multiple and far from
paltry. First, there have been the plain facts of American constitu
tional history and the just-as-plain limits on what plausibly can be
made of these facts. In short, while history belies the fixity of constitu
tional meanings that moral-universalistic rights-foundationalism would
imply, historiographical means are not up to the task of showing the
American People "speaking" at the times and in a manner that credi
bly could support judicial review in the guise of mere enforcement of
the law the People have spoken.113 A second ground for rejecting time
bound democratic positivism is the pragmatic one: principles enacted
years ago will not deal intelligently with current issues and problems,
and the formal amendment scheme cannot sustain the burdens of
transition.114 And a second ground for rejecting timeless rights founda
tionalism is the demand, issued in the name of democracy, that the
law's value-orderings should be determined by politically responsible
institutions.115
·

x

Behind Sandalow's double-edged critique of the democratic
positivist and rights-foundationalist approaches to constitutional adju
dication, motivating it, lies a premise never quite in so many words
laid down and defended: that the point of constitutional adjudication
is the effectuation of some set of values, if not sheerly for the sake of
113. See supra Parts VII-VIII.
1 14. See supra note 38.
1 15. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
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those values then for the sake of due respect for the human beings, be
they the People or the Framers, whose values they are. It is only that
premise that gives point to Sandalow's effort to demonstrate that the
governing values must be those right now held by contemporary soci
ety. But the premise is a contested one. It is one thing to conclude that
both a democratic-positivist constitutional practice and a rights
foundationalist practice are noncredible, given both what history
shows and the limitations on what it is able to show. It is quite another
thing to claim that a country needs to have, or in any way benefits
from having, a practice of constitutional-norm recognition geared to
'
anyone s decided account of any set of values.
There remains, after all, to be reckoned with the view - call it
constitutional formalism - that what a country relevantly needs, and
all it relevantly needs, is to have in place an effective, nigh-universally
recognized and accepted system of positive legal ordering, and that the
point of constitutional adjudication simply is to uphold the formal rule
of positive law. Thus if ordinary legislative enactments can be shown
to violate norms that can, with fafr certainty and near-unanimity, be
derived by strict and formal legal reasoning from enacted constitu
tional texts, let .them be stricken. Otherwise, leave them be.116 No
doubt that would leave the set of judicially operative constitutional
norms quite shrunken by comparison with what we are used to or with
what Sandalow-style, contemporary-community-values constitution
alism would deliver.117 But that would seem exactly the conclusion de
voutly to b� wished by an ideal conception of democracy as majori
tarian process, as good conduct under smoothly running majoritarian
institutions of representative government.
What is it, then, that motivates Sandalow's attachment to a more
robust conception of constitutional law drawn from active determina
tions of the contemporary lie of community values? Evidently, it is
Sandalow's deeper conception of democracy as outcome and not as
process - his conception of democracy as consisting in correspon
dence between the value orderings wrought by representative gov
ernment's legislative acts and the value-orderings currently held by so
ciety or the people. I suggested earlier118 that the outcome conception
of democracy (outcomes corresponding with community values) and
not the "process" conception (politically responsible, representative
institutions get to make the final decisions) must have been the deeper
one for Sandalow, and now we can see an additional ground for my
suggestion. A majoritarian process conception seems to fit happily

116. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L. J. 1 (1971).
117. See, e.g. , Sandalow, Freedom of Speech, supra note 38.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 75-77.
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with a constitutional minimalism that Sandalow refrains from em
bracing. The outcome conception, by contrast, fits aptly with the
proposition that constitutional meanings are to be drawn, by whom
ever draws them, from analyses of contemporary community values.
XI
We are left with a remark�ble theory of judici�l review, one that
appears to be unique among contemporary contenders. On the one
hand, the theory rejects both interpretative formalism and interpreta
tive minimalism. Far from calling for judicial retirement from the
field,119 the theory prescribes what only can be called an activist judi
cial role. It cuts courts loose from bindings either to constitutional
texts or to the implications of historically verifiable, higher-lawmaking
events. At the same time, though, it rejects a timeless, moral
universalist grounding for constitutional law. Indeed, it rejects judicial
supremacy altogether - although not judicial activism - by de
manding that the courts seek ways to purge their constitutional-legal
pronouncements of finality vis-a-vis legislative operations measuring
up to an achievable standard of political responsibility. In sum: (1)
courts as courts - courts distinct from legislatures - have an impor
tant job to do in the project of constitutionalism; (2) that job does not,
however, consist in overriding cluly considered, legislatively enacted
value-orderings; (3) and yet it does consist in bringing constitutional
values effectively to bear on political lawmaking; and finally (4) nei
ther the People's higher-lawmaking acts nor the timeless truths of mo
rality provide the courts with standards by which to proceed in doing
that job.
How· can such a mix of conclusions possibly make sense and hold
together? It can and does, if and only if you agree with Sandalow that
(a) the democratic ideal - m,eaning, in the last analysis, . the American
constitutionalist ideal - boils down to keeping government opera
tions, lawmaking included, in tune with basic, contemporary commu
nity values; and (b) in the practical execution of that ideal, courts can
play a useful, assistive role to the country's more politically responsi
ble institutions by lodging into the process, suspensively only, their le
gally informed and legally reasoned assessments of mismatch between
historic American constitutional values and particular acts of government.
I have reservations. They pertain mainly to the conception of con
stitutional democracy as background democracy, as the due respon
siveness of governmental outcomes to the basic values of the sur
rounding society. There is more to democracy than that, I believe,120
·

.

1 19. As, for example, does TUSHNET, supra note 12.
120. See works cited supra note 60.
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and there must be on the outspokenly liberal-individualist views put
forth by Sandalow in some of his later writings, especially given the
strong assumptions of value pluralism we also find in them.121 In fact. I
would not bet the ranch that Sandalow's "contemporary community
values" will not turn out, on extended, close examination, to be stand
ins or guideposts for certain transcendent-universal liberal verities.
That would be, however, a story for another time.
XII
Constitutional law is serious stuff. What people think about it and
accordingly do about it can make a serious difference.122 To say so is
not yet to deny that the best way to deal with constitutional law might
be to refuse to take it seriously. But don't try telling that to Terry
Sandalow. Terry stands firm among those who cannot help responding
to serious matters by trying to think and argue them through, step by
step.123 By his example, he sets us a daunting standard of rigor, study,
plain speaking, nerve, and revulsion from cant. A good thing, too,
even if we cannot always, or ever, quite measure up.

121. See Terrance Sandalow, A Skeptical Look at Contemporary Republicanism, 41 FLA.
L. REV. 523, 525, 528-34 (1989); Sandalow, Distrust of Politics, supra note 54, at 453-55, 457,
468.
122. I doubt this is controversial. Consider, for example, the difference possibly made by
what Abraham Lincoln thought and did about constitutional law. See Sanford Levinson, Was
the Emancipation Proclamation Constitutional? Do We Care What the Answer Is? (David
C. Baum Memorial Lecture Series on Civil Liberties and Civil Rights, Univ. of Ill. Law
School, Apr. 5, 2001) (on file with author).
·
123. I do not mean he never writes with irony, wit, or a twinkle in the eye. See, e.g.,
Terrance Sandalow, The Supreme Court in Politics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1300, 1300-03 (1990)
(reviewing ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: How THE BORK NOMINATION SHOOK
AMERICA (1989)).

